This project explores the link between managerial overconfidence and banks' asset valuation behavior in the aftermath of the 2007 financial crisis. Thereby, it provides empirical evidence that banks with overconfident CFOs rely more heavily on valuation models designed for inactive markets only, known as Level 3 fair value 
INTRODUCTION
If markets are disrupted, i.e., if there are no orderly transactions in active markets, not even of similar assets or model inputs, firms are allowed to rely on internal models with firmgenerated, unobservable inputs to determine the value of their fair value assets (SFAS 157) .
These values are called Level 3 estimates. Nevertheless, there is no objective identification mechanism for disrupted markets, and not even a significant drop in liquidity is sufficient to classify a market as disrupted (Center for Audit Quality, 2007) 1 . In most situations, the management has to rely on market movements, which they perceive as extreme and unusual, to identify a disrupted market. Thereby, it remains in the discretion of a firm's management and its auditors to agree on which markets they perceive as disrupted at a particular point in time.
Because of the lacking transparency with respect to the firm's perceptions, this assessment remains opaque and varies from firm to firm.
This paper raises the question if personal characteristics of the managers might explain some of the variation in the use of Level 3 estimates. Thereby, it focuses on the behavioral traits of managerial overconfidence 2 . While overconfidence is "perhaps the most robust finding in the psychology of judgment" (De Bondt and Thaler, 1995) , it might heavily distort the expected distribution on an asset's returns, e.g., shift the expected mean upwards or narrow the bandwidth of the expected distribution. As a consequence, observed market movements will more easily be perceived as extreme outcomes due to the too narrow or upward-biased expectations or a distorted self-attribution, i.e., the market will be perceived as disrupted.
1 Center for Audit Quality (2007, p. 4) : "The fact that transaction volume in a market is significantly lower than in previous periods does not necessarily mean that these are forced or distressed sales. Moreover, decreased volumes in a market do not necessarily mean that market has become inactive." 2 For a recent and detailed literature overview on managerial overconfidence, see Ben-David et al. (2013) .
Using a time-variant form of the Net Buyer measure of managerial overconfidence developed by Malmendier and Tate (2005) , this study documents a robust link between CFO overconfidence and the use of Level 3 estimates. CEO overconfidence possesses no explanatory power on the use of Level 3 estimates. This finding corresponds to the managerial job sharing (Anantharaman and Lee, 2014) and the responsibility of CFOs for lower level accounting behavior (Jiang et al., 2010) . Various control variables, as well as bank and year fixed effects, alleviate concerns regarding omitted influences with respect to the business models, managerial skills, or macroeconomic conditions. In line with the literature, there is a general discount of Level 3 estimates by the capital market. Although overconfident CFOs tend to value a larger share of their balance sheet using Level 3 estimates, evidence indicates no statistically significant differences in the capital market perception; e.g., those assets are not perceived as more reliable or less overvalued. Thus, results are unlikely to be driven by signaling or insider trading based on superior private information, which would correspond with higher market values and represent competing explanations. Furthermore, the larger share of those Level 3 estimates provides another channel through which managerial overconfidence impacts firm value.
The study contributes to the literature in several ways. While there is an active debate on the consequences of managerial incentives with important insights into managerial behavior (e.g., Mehran and Rosenberg, 2007; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011) , the empirical evidence on managerial traits in the banking industry is scarce. A recent study by Black and Gallemore (2013) is one of the few exceptions. Examining the provisioning behavior for bad customer loans during the financial crisis, it provides empirical evidence that banks with overconfident CFOs build their provisions at a later point in time and in a lower quantity compared to banks with non-overconfident CFOs. Looking at those traits in financial firms helps improve our understanding of the financial crisis and bank behavior in troubled markets.
The study closely relates to the literature on the economic outcome of managerial overconfidence. Malmendier and Tate (2005; establish a link between managerial overconfidence and corporate investment inefficiencies in industrial firms. Schrand and Zechman (2012) document an increased probability of financial misreporting of overconfident managers, while Hillary and Hsu (2011) and Libby and Rennekamp (2012) explore the consequences of overconfidence on the managerial forecasting behavior. Ben-David et al.
(2013) provide empirical evidence that miscalibrated managers, as one manifestation of overconfidence, follow a more aggressive corporate policy, including a higher level of investment accompanied by a larger share of debt financing. Pointing toward positive consequences of managerial overconfidence, Hirshleifer et al. (2012) provide evidence in favor of increased innovation activity by overconfident managers. Ahmed and Duellman (2013) provide empirical evidence on a negative link between overconfident managers and accounting conservatism. It is further related to a recent study by Bouwman (2014) . Looking at industrial firms between 1984 and 1994 , Bouwman (2014 documents more earnings smoothing accompanied by smaller earnings surprises by overconfident managers.
Financial firms are especially suited to study this research question since they rely on fair value accounting for large parts of their balance sheet (Laux and Leuz, 2010) . Therefore, it is easier to detect a manager's perception of disrupted markets by looking at the firm's reporting behavior. Moore and Healy (2008) define overconfidence in three distinct ways. Overestimation refers to an individual's tendency to overestimate his or her own ability and chances to succeed. When managers with an overestimation bias are asked to value a security, they overestimate the expected return of their portfolio while correctly assessing its expected standard deviation. In case of downwards markets or in crisis situations, the market will be perceived as disrupted more frequently, as the biased value strongly deviates from observable transaction prices.
OVERCONFIDENCE AND HYPOTHESIS
Nevertheless, abnormally high returns are less likely to be attributed to extreme market movements but are perceived as normal.
Overprecision, or miscalibration, in contrast, refers to the systematic underestimation of the range of potential outcomes, producing distributions that are too narrow. Using a 10-year survey panel including more than 13,000 CFO stock forecasts, Ben-David et al. (2013) provide evidence that managerial miscalibration is especially strong during periods of high market uncertainty. Similar to the overestimation bias, the overprecision trait makes it more likely to perceive market movements as extreme and "not normal." The use of Level 3 valuations appears more suitable to an overconfident manager.
Overplacement, or the better-than-average effect, refers to the personal trait to overplace one's own ability when compared to others. In case of an overplacement bias, managers might perceive their own skills, e.g., in the asset selection process, to be superior compared to peer managers. As a result, the biased managers expect the own portfolios to outperform the market.
Compared to similar assets that are traded in active markets, the managers perceive those assets as noncomparable and the observed market prices as unsuitable to value their own portfolio. In those situations as well, the manager strives toward a model-based valuation method with unobservable, manager-supplied inputs.
Apart from the three facets of overconfidence by Moore and Healy (2008) , a biased selfattribution is often associated with overconfidence (Hirshleifer, 2001) . Following this selfattribution bias, people attribute good outcomes more often to their abilities, while bad outcomes are attributed to external factors, such as disrupted markets.
Taken together, it is hypothesized that:
Hypothesis: Overconfident CFOs use a higher share of Level 3 valuation.
VARIABLES, EMPIRICAL APPROACH AND SAMPLE a) MANAGERIAL OVERCONFIDENCE
The empirical assessment of managerial overconfidence poses several challenges to the researcher. While individual interviews or special questionnaires of managers allow for a more direct identification (Ben-David et al., 2013) , they are usually unfeasible for most settings due to the high effort required and low response rates. Therefore, the study relies on a measure based on the managers' personal stock market transactions, which has been established by Malmendier and Tate (2005) . The measure relies on the notion that a manager's personal wealth is underdiversified since large parts of the human capital, as well as the wages, are tied to the manager's own company. Malmendier and Tate (2005) show that even for mild forms of risk aversion, rational managers should not engage in open market transactions to increase the risk exposure to their own firm 3 . In contrast to Malmendier and Tate (2005) , who determine managers as overconfident when they engage in net buying during a calibration period, a rolling window is used to estimate managerial overconfidence in a time-varying way. 4 Thereby, I follow Billett and Qian (2008) , who provide evidence that managerial overconfidence changes over time. Using time-varying overconfidence measures allows to control for firm fixed effects, which alleviates concerns regarding omitted firm-specific variables.
Alternative overconfidence measures based on managerial option exercise behavior, e.g., Malmendier and Tate (2005) or Sen and Turmakin (2009) , are not suitable for financial firms during the sample period at hand. Those measures require the exercisable stock options to be in the money, i.e., the respective stock price must exceed the strike price of the option. Stock options are generally granted at the money (Heron and Lie, 2007) In the subsequent analysis, only those manager firm years will be treated as Net Buyer, where the respective manager increases the amount of shares using open market transactions. All manager firm years that are characterized by a net reduction or by no open market insider transaction will serve as a control group.
Insert Table 1 around here
Looking at the managerial behavior of the CEO and the CFO in a given year, table 1 indicates a small tendency of a coordinated behavior. While CFOs only engage in net buying in 18% of the firm years in which CEOs are not Net Buyers, the share increases to around 44% of the firm years if the CEO is characterized as a Net Buyer as well. As a potential explanation, there might be a shared mindset in the managerial team in a given year or truly coordinated behavior.
Nevertheless, this behavior is far from perfectly correlated.
c) EMPIRICAL APPROACH
In a first step, the study seeks to identify determinants of Level 3 estimates. The share of Level 3 assets on a bank's balance sheet (ShareL3) will serve as the dependent variable. Since it is censored between 0 and 1, an OLS estimator might yield inconsistent results. Following Papke and Wooldridge (1996; , a quasi-binomial population-averaged panel model is used with the canonical link (logit). This approach has already been applied to the share of Level 3 assets by Glaser et al. (2014) . Unreported evidence shows that results remain qualitatively unchanged when using an OLS panel model or looking at changes instead of levels. Period and firm fixed effects account for unobserved time-and firm-specific factors. stock in the year before the current fiscal year. The lag structure should ensure that there is no reverse causality. Because of the CFO's responsibility for the accounting behavior of the firm, a positive link between CFO overconfidence and the use of valuation models designed for disrupted markets is hypothesized. In the course of the analysis, the overconfidence measure for the CFO is replaced and later complemented by the overconfidence measure for the CEO. While the CEO is responsible for a bank's general strategy, including the bank's general risk taking, a link between CEO overconfidence and the share of Level 3 assets would suggest that the assets' underlying risk is a driving force for the results rather than a distorted perception of disrupted markets.
To incorporate the monitoring incentives by the auditor and of external capital suppliers, I
rely on the auditor's industry expertise and on the weaker monitoring incentives of insured deposit holders in banks. The consequences of external monitoring are explored by looking at the client-auditor relationship. The auditor's industry expertise thereby captures the larger specific knowledge base within a particular industry as well as a larger industry-specific audit
technology (Neal and Riley, 2004) . Those industry-specific technologies are especially vital in efficiently auditing model estimates of fair values (Martin et al., 2006; Bratten et al., 2013) . Therefore, the model from equations (1) and (2) The explanatory variables are the bank's size (LnTA), the profitability (RoE, Loss), and the deposit ratio (Dep). In order to test whether the use of Level 3 assets is tied to a bank's regulatory capital ratio, which closely relates to leverage ratios of industrial firms, the Tier 1 capital ratio (T1) is included as an explanatory variable. In line with the literature, control variables that refer to balance sheet items are taken from the beginning of the period while items from the profit and loss statement refer to the previous twelve months of a given year.
In a second step, the market perception, measured by Tobin's Q, is taken as dependent variable. As major control variables, the study relies on the managerial net buying, the share of Level 3 assets, and the link between those two. Thereby, the study can deal with competing explanations regarding the underlying managerial motives of insider trading behavior. 
MAIN RESULTS

a) THE INFLUENCE OF MANAGERIAL OVERCONFIDENCE
In the following section, a special interest lies on whether managerial overconfidence is linked to the use of fair value model valuation with firm-supplied inputs. Therefore, the study first explores the distribution of various financial statement items in years that are characterized by CFO Net Buyers. While the CFO Net Buyer measure by Malmendier and Tate (2005) is taken from the period between the years t-2 and t-1, the balance sheet items are taken from the annual report of year t. Buyers show a lower profitability, a higher probability of reporting a loss, and a larger Loan-toAsset ratio. Furthermore, banks with fewer total assets more likely have net buying CFOs. With respect to the regulatory capital ratio and the share of deposits on a bank's balance sheet, there is no statistically significant difference between CFO Net Buyers and non-Net Buyers.
Insert
Looking at the fair value hierarchy, a higher share of Level 3 assets and a lower share of Level 1 assets is observed for bank years with net buying CFOs. The differences are statistically significant at the 5% level. This finding can be seen as first evidence in favor of a link between managerial overconfidence and the use of managerial fair value estimates with Level 3 inputs.
Insert Table 3 around here
The univariate correlations of table 3 support findings from the split sample. The empirical analysis shows a positive and statistically significant relation between CFO overconfidence and the subsequent share of Level 3 assets. Furthermore, a correlation exists between the share of Level 3 assets and lower regulatory capital, lower profitability, and a higher deposit ratio.
b) THE LINK BETWEEN MANAGERIAL OVERCONFIDENCE AND LEVEL 3 ASSETS
As suggested by table 2, the use of Level 3 estimates seems to be more pronounced in bank years with overconfident CFOs. In the following section, this link will be further explored in a multivariate setting.
Insert Table 4 around here
As can be seen from column (1) 
Insert table 5 around here
In column (1) of table 5, there is a strong link between the auditing firm's industry expertise in the banking industry and the share of Level 3 assets. One explanation for this finding might be the higher ability of those auditing firms to restrict the tendentious use of discretion in managerial reporting behavior. In column (2), the Big 4 dummy is also associated with a lower share of Level 3 assets, although the statistical significance disappears (z-value of 1.610) when controlling for the auditor's industry expertise. Throughout all specifications, the link between managerial overconfidence and the share of Level 3 assets remains statistically significant.
Therefore, the link between CFO Net Buyer and the share of Level 3 assets is not driven by the client-auditor relationship.
Columns (4) and (5) 
d) INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL MONITORING BY THE CAPITAL SUPPLIER
Similar to the auditing firm, a bank's capital supplier might monitor the bank's management and restrict tendentious reporting behavior.
Insert table 6 around here
In column (1) of table 6, the indicator variable for those bank years with a deposit ratio above the median does not exert a statistically significant influence on the share of Level 3 assets.
Furthermore, the link between the CFO Net Buyer measure of managerial overconfidence and the share of Level 3 assets remains unchanged.
When splitting the sample into those firms with a higher-than-median deposit ratio (column (2)) and lower-than-median deposit ratio (column (3)), there is strong evidence that the link between the CFO Net Buyer measure and the share of Level 3 assets is attributed to those observations with a high deposit ratio. They are characterized by weaker external monitoring of the capital supplier, as insured depositors have the weakest incentives for monitoring compared to all other groups (Billett et al., 1998) . In contrast, the link turns statistically insignificant in column (3) for those bank years with a lower deposit ratio and thus stronger external monitoring incentives by the capital supplier.
ROBUSTNESS ISSUES
While the managerial net buying is often associated with the overconfidence bias, two alternative explanations might be associated with this behavior. Firstly, the managers might use their private information on the firm when the stock is undervalued (Ke et al., 2003) . Secondly, the managers with superior private information might use insider transactions to signal this private information to the market (Damodaran and Liu, 1993) . In both cases, one should see an effect on the market value of the firm.
Insert table 7 around here
As can be seen from column (1) who also find no outperformance of net buying managers. Black and Gallemore (2013) document similar results for overconfident managers in the financial industry. The effects of the control variables are in line with the literature. Especially, there is a discount of Level 3 assets (Song et al., 2010; Mohrmann et al., 2014) , which might indicate an overvaluation of those assets (Huizinga and Laeven, 2012; Milbrath, 2012) or a lack of reliability (Kolev, 2008; Chung et al., 2013) .
In column (2), there is no effect of overconfident CEOs on the bank's Tobin's Q. This finding again speaks against signaling or private information as the driving force behind managerial net buying. Furthermore, the interaction term of CFO net buying with the share of Level 3 assets does not show a statistically significant influence. At the same time, the Level 3 discount remains unchanged. This finding indicates that the market does not perceive those Level 3 assets to be more reliable or less overvalued in cases of net buying CFOs. Those findings yield further evidence that rules out signaling as a competing explanation.
CONCLUSION
This paper raises the question whether personal characteristics of banks' managers might explain some of the variation of the use of Level 3 estimates. Thereby, I focus on the behavioral traits of managerial overconfidence of more than 500 U.S. banks from 2008 to 2012. Using the Net Buyer measure of managerial overconfidence by Malmendier and Tate (2005) , the study documents a robust link between the use of Level 3 estimates and CFO overconfidence. The study presents empirical evidence that it is the CFO's overconfidence that drives Level 3 valuation rather than the CEO's. This finding corresponds to the managerial job sharing (Anantharaman and Lee, 2014) and the responsibility of CFOs for the accounting behavior (Jiang et al., 2010) . In line with the literature, there is a general discount of Level 3 estimates by the capital market. Although overconfident CFOs tend to value a larger share of their balance sheet using Level 3 estimates, empirical evidence indicates no differences in the capital market perception of those assets, e.g., they are not perceived as more reliable or less overvalued, leading to a net increase in the total discount. Furthermore, the results are unlikely to be driven by signaling or insider trading based on superior private information as competing explanations.
The results from this study have important consequences for regulatory authorities as well as market participants. When allowing a firm's managers and auditors to deviate from observed market prices whenever they perceive the market to be disrupted (SFAS 157), managerial characteristics such as overconfidence might drive those decisions. Outside transparency on those markets that are considered disrupted, as well as better corporate governance, might help mitigate those influences. While Level 3 estimates are perceived as equally overvalued by the capital market, the results might show a channel through which managerial overconfidence might lead to a capital market discount for those firms.
FIGURES AND TABLES
Figure 1: Time Structure in brackets (*** significant at the 1 % level, ** significant at the 5 % level, * significant at the 10 % level).
(1) (2) Robust standard errors are clustered at the bank level. Robust z-statistics are displayed in brackets (*** significant at the 1 % level, ** significant at the 5 % level, * significant at the 10 % level).
(1) Table 7 reports the results from the OLS estimation for the pooled sample that regresses Tobin's Q on the displayed variables. Variable definitions can be found in the Appendix A. Robust standard errors are clustered on the bank level. Robust t-statistics are displayed in brackets (*** significant at the 1 % level, ** significant at the 5 % level, * significant at the 10 % level).
(1) Return on Equity (RoE) Net profit scaled by the market value of equity at the beginning of the quarter. 
